Arxiu del divendres, 27/04/2018

Qualia: The Knowledge Argument

divendres, 27/04/2018

Martine Nida-Rumelin

First published: Sep 3, 2002;
substantive revision: Nov 23, 2009

The knowledge argument aims to establish that conscious experience involves non-physical properties. It rests on the idea that someone who has complete physical knowledge about another conscious being might yet lack knowledge about how it feels to have the experiences of that being. It is one of the most discussed arguments against physicalism.

  • 1. Remarks About the History of the Underlying Intuition
  • 2. The Basic Idea
  • 3. Some Clarifications
    • 3.1 Two Versions of the Argument
    • 3.2 Physical and Non-physical
    • 3.3 Knowing what it is like
  • 4. Objections
    • 4.1 Doubts about the Thought Experiment
    • 4.2 Complete Physical Knowledge without Knowledge of all the Physical Facts
    • 4.3 No Propositional Knowledge 1: the Ability Hypothesis
    • 4.4 Objections Against the Ability Hypothesis
    • 4.5 No Propositional Knowledge 2: the Acquaintance Hypothesis
    • 4.6 The New Knowledge/Old Fact-View
    • 4.7 Variants of the New Knowledge/Old Fact View
    • 4.8 Objections Against the New Knowledge/Old Fact View
  • 5. The Dualist View About the Knowledge Argument
  • 6. Concluding Remark

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