Arxiu del dissabte, 26/01/2019


dissabte, 26/01/2019


Objectiveness is continuously graded

The definition of subjectiveness and objectiveness seems to be more ambiguous than intuitively believed. When you walk in a park, for example, and count the number of blue birds flying in the park, the number of the birds can be regarded as a kind of data and the data appears to be objective. But, it may become ‘less’ objective if, when you counted the birds, no one was walking around and no one observed the birds. It may become ‘far less’ objective if you never saw the birds again in the park in the following days and years. On the contrary, it may become ‘more’ objective if many people saw the birds with you at that 8 time and you and others repeatedly observed them many times in the following days as well. In more details, the data appears to be ‘more’ objective if you counted the birds with 20 individuals than you did as one individual. As well, the data appears to be ‘more’ objective if you saw and counted the birds repeatedly for 20 consecutive days than you did it for only one additional day. Next, let’s think more realistic and scientific situation.Resultado de imagen de Daisuke H. Tanaka and Tsutomu Tanabe

The data obtained in scientific studies can be regarded sufficiently objective and reliable to be published in scientific journals. However, all data published in scientific journals may not necessarily be objective and reliable homogeneously. In some experiments, for example, multiple researchers performed the same experiments repeatedly and other researchers analyzed the data in a blinded manner, while, in some other experiments, only one researcher performed all the experiments and analyzed the data by himself/herself. One may argue that results obtained in the former cases are more objective and reliable compared to those obtained in the latter case since, in the latter case, some subjective aspects of the researcher who performed all the experiments and the analyses might be included in the resultant data. Taken together, it appears to be true that objectiveness of a certain issue is not always black and white in nature, but there are some degrees of objectiveness for any issues. That is, some can represent ‘low’ objectiveness and the others can represent ‘high’ objectiveness. The terms ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ appears to be located in antipole of the same axis and most subjects appear to be located in between and represent a certain degree of objectiveness.

Although the degree of objectiveness of a certain issue seems to be vaguely judged by relevant human community, it is possible that various factors would affect the judgment of the degree of objectiveness of each issue.

Daisuke H. Tanaka and Tsutomu Tanabe, Graduate School of Medicine, Tokyo

Conscious Agents

dissabte, 26/01/2019

Donald Hoffman, Ph.D.Cognitive Scientist and Author, Department of CognitiveSciences, U.C. Irvine Donald Hoffman is a cognitive scientist and author of more than 90 scientific papers and three books, including Visual Intelligence: How We Create What We See (W.W. Norton, 2000). He received his BA from UCLA in Quantitative Psychology and his Ph.D. from MIT in Computational Psychology. He joined the faculty of UC Irvine in 1983, where he is now a full professor in the departments of cognitive science, computer science and philosophy. He received a Distinguished Scientific Award of the American Psychological Association for early career research into visual perception, and the Troland Research Award of the US National Academy of Sciences for his research on the relationship of consciousness and the physical world.

Scientific investigations of consciousness that seek its biological basis typically assume that objects in space-time —such as neurons— exist even if unperceived, and have causal powers.

Using evolutionary games and genetic algorithms that study perceptual evolution, and find that it is almost surely false. Our perceptions of space-time and objects are a species-specific adaptation, not an insight into objective reality.

The theory of “conscious agents”—that takes consciousness to be fundamental, rather than derivative from objects in space-time. I use the theory of conscious agents to solve the combination problem of consciousness, both for the combination of subjects and of experiences. I show that entanglement follows as a consequence of the combination of conscious subjects. I then discuss the relationship of these findings to the account of entanglement given by quantum-Bayesian interpretations of quantum theory.